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Monitoring the environment for visual events while performing a concurrent task requires
adjustment of visual processing priorities. By use of Bundesen’s (1990) Theory of Visual
Attention, we investigated how monitoring for an object-based brief event affected distinct
components of visual attention in a concurrent task. The perceptual salience of the event
was varied. Monitoring reduced the processing speed in the concurrent task, and the
reduction was stronger when the event was less salient. The monitoring task neither
affected the temporal threshold of conscious perception nor the storage capacity of visual
short-term memory nor the efﬁciency of top-down controlled attentional selection.
Keywords: visual attention,TVA, sustained attention, vigilance, salience, event-based prospective memory
INTRODUCTION
Monitoring the environment for visual events is a frequent require-
ment of everyday tasks. Monitoring errors can have tremendous
consequences, for example when an anesthesiologist fails to detect
aberrations in displays of a patient’s vital signs (see e.g., Seagull
et al., 2001) or when an air trafﬁc controller misses conﬂicting
routes of air crafts (see e.g., Remington et al., 2000).
One may deﬁne monitoring as preparing for detecting visual
events in the environment. Events could, for instance, refer to a
change in appearance of a task-relevant object. In realistic situa-
tions, monitoring tasks can occur interwoven with a plethora of
other activities. To date, however, little is known about the effects
of monitoring for visual events on visual information processing
within other concurrent activities.
For decades, monitoring has been investigated in the ﬁeld of
vigilance research (for an overview, see Davies and Parasuraman,
1982). Classical vigilance experiments required participants to
detect and respond to rare visual events that occurred in between
periods of visual stimulation without response requirements
(e.g., Mackworth, 1948). In such tasks, detection performance
typically declines over time. This result was termed “vigilance
decrement,” and it has given rise to a conceptualization of vig-
ilance as a “. . . psychological readiness to perceive and respond
. . .” (Mackworth, 1948). Numerous explanations for the vigilance
decrement have been proposed (Davies and Parasuraman, 1982)
and are still debated (Hancock, 2013; see also Ariga and Lleras,
2011). The bulk of vigilance experiments comprised scenarios
of preparatory monitoring during periods of low external stim-
ulation where attention had to be sustained (Hancock, 2013).
This research focused on the outcomes of monitoring, namely
on detection performance. No studies asked how components of
visual information processing are modiﬁed within the period of
monitoring. In our investigation, we focus on the issue of how
monitoring affects components of visual attention.
Visual attention summarizes a number of processes that gov-
ern priorities in visual information processing (e.g., Duncan,
2006; Chun et al., 2011). As a result of these priorities, currently
relevant rather than irrelevant information is internally repre-
sented to be available for action control (Allport, 1987; Neumann,
1987; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Schneider, 1995; Dun-
can, 2006). A framework for describing how this prioritization
might be accomplished is provided by the “biased competition”
approach. All inputs from the visual ﬁeld may compete against
each other for being available to control actions and this com-
petition may be biased by representations of the current task
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Such task representations deﬁne
sets of processing priorities (“attentional sets”) andmay stem from
working memory (e.g., Olivers et al., 2011) or long-term memory
(e.g., Woodman et al., 2013).
A speciﬁc biased competition theory about distinct attentional
components was suggested by Bundesen’s (1990) computational
Theory of Visual Attention (TVA). TVA assumes visual information
processing to be organized in separate processing stages. Visual
short-term memory (VSTM) is the stage at which visual informa-
tion is temporarily maintained and becomes available for action
control, so that it can be reported or acted upon. At a preced-
ing stage, competition of objects in the visual ﬁeld takes place.
This competition is characterized as a race of possible categoriza-
tions of objects. The categorizations that ﬁnish processing ﬁrst
win the race and enter VSTM, provided there is still a free “slot”
for storing information about the respective object (for evidence
for such a capacity limitation of VSTM, see Luck andVogel, 1997).
In TVA, two attentional mechanisms (ﬁltering and pigeonholing)
jointly determine which of the categorizations of objects in the
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visual ﬁeld win the race and are encoded into VSTM. TVA’s ﬁl-
tering mechanism was used to explain observations of “focused
attention” where processing was concentrated on relevant at the
expense of irrelevant visual objects (for a review, see Bundesen
and Habekost, 2008). Visual processing appears to be limited
in capacity so that only a certain number of visual objects can
be processed at a given time (e.g., Duncan, 2006). Filtering is
assumed to operate by assigning each object in the visual ﬁeld an
attentional priority reﬂecting its current relevance and salience
(Nordfang et al., 2013). In TVA, these attentional priorities of
objects are called “attentional weights.” The processing speed of a
categorization of an object is proportional to the absolute atten-
tional weight allocated to this object, normalized by the attentional
weights allocated to all objects in the visual ﬁeld. Therefore, ﬁl-
tering directly affects the probability that an object-categorization
ﬁnishes processing earlier than others andwins the race. TVA’s sec-
ond attentional mechanism, pigeonholing, consists of biases for
categorizing visual objects as belonging to certain task-relevant
categories. Like ﬁltering, it is assumed to inﬂuence the processing
speed of categorizations and thus their probability of winning the
race to VSTM.
Using a TVA-based letter-report task (Vangkilde et al., 2011;
see below), ﬁve distinct attentional components can be obtained.
Each component represents a speciﬁc aspect of attentional func-
tioning (for overviews, see also Bundesen and Habekost, 2008,
2014). (1) The threshold of conscious perception, t0, is the maxi-
mum ineffective exposure duration of a visual stimulus. That is, it
indexes the time necessary to initiate the race of object categoriza-
tions to VSTM. (2) The maximum number of visual objects that
can be maintained in VSTM, K, is taken as a measure of VSTM
storage capacity. (3) Visual processing speed, C, reﬂects the overall
available visual processing capacity which is distributed across the
objects in the visual ﬁeld according to their attentional weights.
(4) The top-down controlled attentional selectivity, α, represents
the efﬁciency of TVA’s ﬁltering process. It captures how efﬁciently
the processing of relevant visual objects can be prioritized over
the processing of irrelevant ones. (5) The laterality of attentional
weighting, windex, provides an index of spatial attentional biases
that lead to preferred encoding of visual objects from one of
the visual hemiﬁelds (cf. Duncan et al., 1999; Vangkilde et al.,
2011). To date, these TVA-based components have been applied
to characterize attentional performance in a variety of psycholog-
ical, neuropsychological, and physiological studies (for overviews,
see Bundesen and Habekost, 2008, 2014). They may thus provide
suitable measures to capture effects of event monitoring on visual
attention.
Whether or notmonitoring affects visual attention components
might be especially important in situations where, concurrently
to monitoring, another task has to be performed. In the above
sketched real-life situation, an anesthesiologist might have to pre-
pare for detecting changes in visual displays of a patient’s vital signs
while performing other tasks, such as the administration of anes-
thetics. Such situations may be reminiscent of tasks of event-based
prospective memory. In such tasks, the intention to respond to an
external event is formed and maintained over a retention interval
while another ongoing task is performed, and then enacted when
the event actually occurs (for reviews, see Ellis and Kvavilashvili,
2000; Burgess et al., 2011). During this retention interval, perfor-
mance in the ongoing task seems impaired (e.g., Smith, 2003). In
the prospective memory literature, this ﬁnding of task interference
was interpreted as evidence for an overlap of attentional process-
ing resources recruited by both, the ongoing and the event-based
prospective memory task. Consequently, preparatory attentional
processes were proposed, which monitor the environment for
events to support event-based prospective memory (Smith, 2003;
Smith and Bayen, 2004). It was implicitly assumed that only one
form of attentional resource exists that has to be shared between
tasks (for a critical discussion, see Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987).
In this view, tasks may either consume this resource or be “auto-
matic”without resource consumption (for a critical discussion, see
Neumann, 1984). Using TVA-based assessment, this suggestion of
sharing one general attentional resource can be replaced by assum-
ing several independent attentional resource components such
as VSTM storage capacity, attentional weighting and top-down
selectivity.
One factor that may be critical for effects of monitoring for
visual events on visual attention may be the perceptual salience of
the events. Salience plays a central role in all three of the men-
tioned research domains. Firstly, performance in detecting rare
events seems not to decline with time-on-task when events are
highly salient (Helton and Warm, 2008). Secondly, visual stimuli
of high salience can capture visual attention, that is, can intrinsi-
cally call for a prioritization in processing over low-salience stimuli
(e.g., Theeuwes, 2004). Thirdly, the attentional demands made by
event-based prospective memory tasks are thought to be lower in
case of highly salient events (e.g., McDaniel and Einstein, 2000;
Hicks et al., 2005). Therefore, the effects of monitoring for visual
events on visual attention could vary depending on the expected
perceptual salience of the events. For instance, monitoring for
highly salient events might rely more on the expected ability of
the events to capture attention. This may lead to weaker effects
on visual attention in a concurrent ongoing task, compared to
monitoring for events of lower salience.
The aims of the present study were to investigate, ﬁrst, how
monitoring for visual events affects the distinct TVA-based atten-
tional components in a concurrent ongoing task and, second,
whether these effects vary with the expected salience of the
events. The experiment consisted of two overlapping tasks. First,
participants performed an ongoing letter-report task enabling
the TVA-based estimation of the attentional components (cf.
Bundesen, 1990; Vangkilde et al., 2011). Second, event monitor-
ing was required while engaging in the ongoing letter-report
task. Events were brief luminance increases of a central ﬁxation
cross. Each participant performed three conditions. In the low-
and high-salient event condition, participants monitored for and
responded to events. Events were of lower salience in the for-
mer than in the latter condition. In the control condition, events
were as salient as in the low-salient event condition, but par-
ticipants were not required to monitor for them or to respond
to them. Importantly, we attempted to capture only effects on
the attentional components that were due to the preparatory
monitoring for events. Therefore, only trials containing neither
events nor related responses were analyzed. Moreover, we aimed
at keeping the extent to which events were monitored constant
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for each of the two event conditions by regularly giving feedback
about detection performance. This feedback (cf. Ariga and Lleras,
2011) and possibly the structure of the letter-report task should
have prevented time-on-task effects, such as vigilance decrements
(McAvinue et al., 2012; see also Matthias et al., 2010). In addition
to our ﬁrst experiment (Experiment A), we conducted a repli-
cation experiment comprising identical experimental conditions
(Experiment B).
How might event monitoring affect the TVA-based attentional
components? First, monitoring for a visual event could involve
the maintenance of a representation of this event in VSTM to
enable its use to deﬁne the attentional set for the task (cf. Olivers
et al., 2011). This requirement should have lowered the storage
capacity available to maintaining letters of the letter-report task.
In this case, the estimated VSTM capacity should have been lower
in the two event conditions compared to the control condition
where monitoring was not necessary. In addition, if the salience
of events affected the need for such a representation, then the
estimatedVSTM capacity should also differ between the two event
conditions.
Second, the event-based prospective memory literature sug-
gests that monitoring should consume unspeciﬁc and capacity-
limited attentional resources (Smith, 2003; Smith and Bayen,
2004). In the framework provided by TVA (Bundesen, 1990),
speciﬁc attentional resources such as visual processing speed are
assumed. In the present experiments, more visual processing
resources should be assigned to process the ﬁxation cross when
it is monitored for events compared to when it is not. Under
such circumstances, less resources should be available for process-
ing the letters of the letter-report task. Therefore, the processing
speed of the letters should be reduced in the event conditions
compared to the control condition. Moreover, events with a higher
salience could intrinsically call for visual processing resources (e.g.,
Theeuwes, 2004) which might lessen the amount of resources that
must be reserved for monitoring potential events. In the high-
salient event condition, this should lead tomore available resources
for processing the letters and thus to a higher processing speed
compared to the low-salient event condition.
In addition to the TVA-based components of VSTM capacity
and visual processing speed, we explored potential effects of mon-
itoring on the threshold of conscious perception, the top-down
controlled selectivity, and the laterality of attentional weighting
and examined the potential role of the salience of events.
To preview the results, the monitoring manipulation affected
the processing speed as predicted and, additionally, the lateral-
ity of attentional weighting. However, no effects of monitoring
were observed with respect to VSTM capacity, the threshold of




Twenty students (13 females, 7 males) from the University of
Copenhagen, Denmark took part in Experiment A, receiving a
shopping voucher for participation. Four participants stated being
left-handed, 16 being right-handed. Their ages ranged from 20.28
to 34.26 years, with a mean age of 24.92 (SD = 2.91).
Nineteen students (13 females, 6 males) from Bielefeld
University, Germany, participated in Experiment B, some of
whom received course credit for participation. Three reported
being left-handed, 16 right-handed. The participants were
between 19.91 and 31.75 years old, with a mean age of 25.91
(SD = 3.15).
All participants of both experiments reported having normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity as well as normal color vision.
Written informed consent was obtained from all of them before
participation.
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
Participants performed Experiment A in a dimly lit room at
the University of Copenhagen, wearing disconnected headphones
(SRH 440, Shure, Niles, IL, USA) to be shielded from sounds.
Stimuli were displayed on a 21′′ or a 19′′ CRT-monitor (G220f,
ViewSonic, Walnut, CA, USA, or Flatron 915 FT plus, LG, Seoul,
South Korea, respectively) running at 100 Hz with a resolution
of 1024 × 768 pixels corresponding to physical dimensions of 40
(width) × 30 (height) cm or 36 (width) × 27 (height) cm, respec-
tively. One participant performed the complete experiment with
a screen refresh rate of 120 Hz. The participant’s data was ana-
lyzed because the appliedmodeling procedure took the refresh rate
into account, so that estimations of the attentional components
should not have been affected. The experimentswere programmed
and conducted using the E-Prime 2.0 software, ensuring accu-
rate timing of the visual presentation (see Schneider et al., 2002).
Participants viewed the screen from a distance of approximately
60 cm. Responses were recorded using a standard computer
keyboard.
Stimuli were presented on a black background. A gray “plus”-
character written in Bell MT font with a size of 18 pt., corre-
sponding to approximately 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ of visual angle, and with a
luminance of 33.12 cd/m2 was used as central ﬁxation cross. Letter
stimuli consisted in red (RBG: 253, 43, 43; 24.57 cd/m2) and blue
(RBG: 43, 53, 255; 14.05 cd/m2) capital letters, written inArial font
with a size of 68 pt., corresponding to approximately 2.7◦ × 2.3◦
of visual angle. Letter masks were made of red and blue letter
fragments and covered an area of 100 × 100 pixels. Events were
luminance increases of the ﬁxation cross to either 43.20 cd/m2 in
the low-salient event and control conditions or to 111.57 cd/m2 in
the high-salient event condition.
Experiment B took place in a dimly lit and sound-attenuated
room at Bielefeld University. Stimuli were shown on a 19′′ CRT-
monitor (G90fB, ViewSonic, Walnut, CA, USA) with a resolution
of 1024 × 768 pixels, corresponding to physical dimensions of 36
(width) × 27 (height) cm. Participants viewed the screen from a
distance of 71 cm, while their head was stabilized by a chin-rest.
The stimuli of Experiment B were identical to those of Experiment
A, except for size and luminance. The dimensions of the central
ﬁxation cross were 0.4◦ × 0.4◦ of visual angle and its luminance
was 42.00 cd/m2. Letter stimuli covered 2.3◦ × 1.9◦ of visual angle.
The luminance of the red target letters was 26.00 cd/m2, the one
of the blue distractor letters 18.00 cd/m2. Events were luminance
increases of the ﬁxation cross to 51.00 cd/m2 in the low-salient
event and control conditions and to 85.00 cd/m2 in thehigh-salient
event condition.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. (A) Course of an example trial.
Participants viewed a ﬁxation cross, followed by a letter display which
was masked afterward. Then they were to report the presented letters.
On 10% of all trials, events consisting in brief luminance increases of
the ﬁxation cross occurred. Participants had to respond to luminance
increases in the low-salient event and high-salient event condition, but
not in the control condition. Luminance increases were greater in the
high-salient event compared to the other two conditions. (B) Letter
displays could be of three different types, enabling the estimation of
attentional components (Vangkilde et al., 2011). (C) Across each
condition, waiting periods to events approximated the non-aging
geometric distribution.
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
The experimental task for measuring the TVA-based attentional
components consisted of a modiﬁed version of the CombiTVA-
paradigm, a letter-report task combining whole and partial report
techniques (Vangkilde et al., 2011). Figure 1A illustrates the course
of an example trial. Each trial beganwith the presentation of a cen-
tral ﬁxation cross for 1000 ms. Then a letter display was presented
that could be one of three types (see Figure 1B). In whole report
trials, either two or six red target letters were presented whereas
partial report trials comprised two red target letters and four blue
distractor letters. In each block, nine 2-letter and eighteen 6-letter
whole report as well as nine partial report trials were administered
in mixed order. Letters in each trial were chosen randomly without
replacement from the set of all capital letters except I, Q,U, and W,
which were omitted to reduce confusability between letters. Letter
displays containing six target letters were presented for either 10,
20, 50, 80, 140, or 200 ms. All other letter displays were shown
for 80 ms. Letters were presented at 45, 90, 135, 225, 270, and
315◦ of an imaginary circle with a radius of approximately 7.5◦
of visual angle (6.35◦ in Experiment B) around the ﬁxation cross.
The letter display was followed by a masking display shown for
500 ms, which always contained six letter masks at the six pos-
sible letter locations. Then a response screen was presented on
which participants could enter letters using the keyboard. These
letters were displayed until participants pressed the “enter”-key
to start the next trial. The participants’ task was to report only
the red target letters, while ignoring the blue distractor letters.
They were instructed to type in the letters (in arbitrary order) they
were “fairly certain”of having seen, refraining from pure guessing.
Moreover, they were instructed to aim at an accuracy of their letter
reports between 80 and 90% (i.e., at error rates between 10 and
20%). The participant’s accuracy level was displayed after each
block.
In 10%of all trials, an event (i.e., luminance increase of the ﬁxa-
tion cross) was presented for 100ms. The event’s onset could occur
either during the sole presentation of the ﬁxation cross, during the
letter display, or during the ﬁrst 400ms of themasking display (i.e.,
the ﬁrst, second, and third displays in Figure 1A). The following
steps were taken to keep the temporal expectation of events con-
stant throughout each condition of the experiment. The speciﬁc
trials on which an event occurred in each condition were ran-
domly determined for each participant. For these trials, the onset
of the event was set to a frame in the refresh cycle of the screen
that was randomly chosen as well. Only one event could appear in
each of those trials. Simulations of 75 complete runs of one con-
dition revealed that the waiting periods (measured in frames of
10 ms) to the occurrences of the ﬁrst, second, etc., and last event
each approximated geometric distributions as assessed by diag-
nostic histograms. Waiting periods across all occurrences of the
events approximated a geometric distribution with a probability
parameter of 0.00138401 (maximum-likelihood), corresponding
to a mean waiting period of 7.23 s (723 frames of 10 ms). A his-
togram of these overall waiting periods is depicted in Figure 1C.
Waiting times following non-aging probability distributions have
been used previously to establish constant temporal expectations
(Vangkilde et al., 2012).
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The monitoring task was manipulated as an independent vari-
able in a within-subject design. Each participant performed the
three different conditions, each comprising nine blocks of 36 tri-
als, and 36 additional trials that were distributed across the nine
blocks and each contained an event. In the low-salient event and
high-salient event conditions, participants were required to press
the space-bar as quickly as possible when an event was presented.
Participants were told that it was very important not to overlook
the events and they were instructed to refrain from reporting let-
ters on these trials. The two event conditions differed only insofar
as events in the high-salient event condition were greater lumi-
nance increases than in the low-salient event condition. After each
block in these conditions, the number of events the participants
correctly responded to and the number of missed events were
displayed on the screen. In the control condition of the monitor-
ing task, luminance increases of the ﬁxation cross were presented
that were identical to those of the low-salient event condition, but
participants were instructed not to respond. They were, however,
informed that irrelevant luminance increases of the ﬁxation cross
occurred.
ExperimentsA and B both took place in two sessions of approx-
imately 90 min, on two days. In Experiment A, participants were
examined either individually or in groups of up to ﬁve partici-
pants, separated by non-transparent curtains. In Experiment B,
participants always performed the experiment alone. Each session
comprised all three conditions. Prior to each condition, partici-
pants performed one block of training trials. The order in which
the conditions were administered in the ﬁrst session was reversed
in the second, to control for effects of fatigue. The overall order
of conditions was counterbalanced across the sample. Prior to the
start of each condition, participants read written instructions on
the screen and reported them to the experimenter in their own
words. In case participants did not report the instructions cor-
rectly, the experimenter repeated the instructions verbally after
which participants paraphrased them again.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Measures of monitoring performance were based on the hits (i.e.,
space-bar presses following events within the same trial) and false
alarms (i.e., space-bar presses on trials without events). The non-
parametric measures of signal detection, A′ and B′′D (Donaldson,
1992) were used to quantify the participant’s sensitivity in detect-
ing events and their bias for reporting an event, respectively. Values
for A′ range from 0.50 (chance level) to 1.00 (perfect sensitivity).
Values for B′′D range from −1.00 to 1.00. Negative values indicate
a bias to respond that an event had been presented, a value of 0.00
indicates no bias, and positive values indicate a bias to respond
that no event had been presented (Donaldson, 1992). In addition,
reaction times (RTs; in ms) for correct responses to events were
collected.
Because participants were instructed to aim at an accuracy
level of their letter reports between 80 and 90%, their error rates
in the three conditions (the proportion of typed-in letters that
were wrong) were collected as a control variable. The ﬁve TVA-
based attentional components (see below) were estimated for each
participant in each of the three conditions. These estimates were
obtained using a maximum-likelihood ﬁtting procedure based on
the number of correctly reported target letters for the different trial
types (i.e., 2 and 6-letter whole report and partial report trials) and
presentation durations of the letter displays (an overview of how
the attentional components are estimated from performance in
the CombiTVA-paradigm is given by Vangkilde et al., 2011; for a
detailed description of the ﬁtting procedure, see Kyllingsbæk, 2006
and Dyrholm et al., 2011). This means that these estimations only
took the letters of the letter-report task into account. Since perfor-
mance in event detection was assessed separately, the ﬁxation cross
was not included in estimations of the attentional components.
A model with 14 free parameters was ﬁtted using the LIBTVA-
toolbox (Dyrholm et al., 2011; see also Habekost et al., 2014) for
MATLAB® (R2011a, The Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA). The
ﬁrst three attentional components were estimated from the num-
bers of correctly reported target letters on 6-letter whole report
trials.
(1) The threshold of conscious perception, t0, is deﬁned as the
lowest presentation duration (measured inms) required to ini-
tiate a race between categorizations for encoding into VSTM.
It is assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution with a
given mean and standard deviation (two free parameters) on
a trial-by-trial basis.
(2) The storage capacity of VSTM, K (measured by the number
of retained letters), is assumed to be drawn from a probability
distribution on each trial that has ﬁve free parameters, namely
the probability that K takes a value of 1, 2, . . ., 5. The proba-
bility that K is 6 equals 1 minus the sum of the ﬁve parameters.
The ﬁnal estimate of K consists in the value that is expected
on the basis of its probability distribution.
(3) The total visual processing capacity or visual processing speed,
C (measured in letters/s), is estimated as follows. In the tradi-
tional TVAmodel, the categorizations of the letters are thought
to be processed in parallel once t0 has passed whereby their
processing times are assumed each to follow an exponential
distribution. The rate parameters of these distributions reﬂect
the speed at which the letter categorizations are processed. The
processing speed, C, is the sum of these rate parameters and it
is thought to be a constant (one free parameter). For the cur-
rent model, the assumption of normally distributed values for
t0 implied an ex-Gaussian distribution of the processing times
(Dyrholm et al., 2011). The last two attentional components
are based on the estimation of attentional weights for target
letters at each of the six locations (ﬁve free parameters).
(4) The top-down controlled attentional selectivity is captured
by comparing the participants’ performance on partial report
trials with their performance on 2-letter whole report trials.
If the four distractor letters on partial report trials do not
exert any distracting effects on performance, then participants
should perform equally in reporting the two target letters on
partial report and on 2-letter whole report trials. The top-
down controlled attentional selectivity is quantiﬁed by the free
parameter α, the attentional weight of a distractor letter rel-
ative to the attentional weight of a target letter. An efﬁcient
selection leads to α values close to 0, an inefﬁcient selection
with no prioritization of target letters over distractor letters,
to α values close to 1.
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(5) The ﬁfth attentional component, windex, represents the lat-
erality of attentional weighting across both visual hemiﬁelds,
assessed as the sum of the attentional weights allocated to let-
ters in the left visual hemiﬁeld in relation to the sum of all
attentional weights in the entire visual ﬁeld. Thus, windex val-
ues of 0.5 indicate no spatial bias, whereas values close to 0
show a right-sided and to 1 a left-sided bias. As mentioned
above, estimations of the attentional components were based
on only those trials on which no events had been presented
and on which participants did not press the space-bar.
RESULTS
The signiﬁcance criterion was set to p = 0.05 for the statistical
analyses. Unless stated otherwise, differences between the three
conditions were examined by using repeated-measures analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) followed by t-tests for dependent sam-
ples. These t-tests were corrected for multiple comparisons using
a modiﬁed Bonferroni adjustment following Keppel (1973). The
signiﬁcance criterion of p = 0.05 was multiplied with the quo-
tient of the degrees of freedom of the examined effect and the
number of comparisons. That is, the signiﬁcance criterion was
set to p = 0.05 × 2/3 = 0.033. Mauchly’s test was used to test
the assumption of sphericity of the ANOVAs. The Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to non-spherical data. Effect sizes
are stated as η2G for ANOVAs (Bakeman, 2005) and Cohen’s dz
(e.g., Faul et al., 2007) for t-tests.
In Experiment A, a few trials in each condition had to be
discarded from the analyses because of technical problems (the
presentation of duplicate letters due to an error in the experimen-
tal program). These trials occurred at random because the letters
were chosen randomly (see above). The mean percentage of dis-
carded trials amounted to 5.36% (SD = 1.35%) in the low-salient
event condition, to 5.24% (SD = 1.53%) in the high-salient event
condition, and to 5.49% (SD = 0.95%) in the control condition.
No trials were discarded in Experiment B.
MONITORING PERFORMANCE
Since participants were not required to perform the event moni-
toring task in the control condition, monitoring performance was
only analyzed for the low- and high-salient event conditions. The
majority of participants did not respond to any events in the con-
trol condition. However, two participants in Experiment A each
responded to one of the 36 events and one pressed the space-bar
on two trials with no events in the control condition. In Experi-
ment B, one participant responded once to an event and another
once pressed the space-bar on a trial with no event in the control
condition.
Because monitoring performance was modeled non-
parametrically, the two event conditions were compared using
the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for which r is
reported as effect size (e.g., Field et al., 2012). In Experiment A,
the participants’ sensitivities for detecting events, as assessed by
A′, were signiﬁcantly lower in the low-salient event (Mdn = 0.85,
Min = 0.65, Max = 0.92) than in the high-salient event condition
(Mdn = 0.95, Min = 0.87, Max = 1.00), z = −4.76, p < 0.001,
r = −0.75. This was replicated in Experiment B (low-salient event
condition: Mdn = 0.87, Min = 0.75, Max = 0.94; high-salient
event condition: Mdn = 0.95,Min = 0.90,Max = 0.98; z = −4.62,
p < 0.001, r = −0.75).
The participants’ bias values for B′′D were positive in both con-
ditions in Experiment A. This indicates that they were biased for
deciding that no event had been presented. Biases were stronger
in the low-salient event (Mdn = 0.98, Min = 0.82, Max = 1.00)
than in the high-salient event condition (Mdn = 0.92,Min = 0.39,
Max = 0.99), z = 4.13, p < 0.001, r = 0.65. Again, this was repli-
cated in Experiment B (low-salient event condition: Mdn = 0.98,
Min=0.73,Max =1.00, high-salient event condition:Mdn=0.94,
Min = 0.74, Max = 0.99; z = 2.98, p = 0.002, r = 0.48).
In Experiment A, RTs for correct responses to events were
numerically longer in the low-salient event (M = 666 ms,
SD = 139) than in the high-salient event condition (M = 606,
SD = 128) and this difference approached signiﬁcance,
t(19) = 2.00, p = 0.060, dz = 0.45. In Experiment B, RTs were
signiﬁcantly longer in the low-salient event (M = 664, SD = 157)
than in the high-salient event condition (M = 568, SD = 101),
t(18)= 2.66, p= 0.016, dz = 0.61. Previous research found RTs for
categorizing stimuli to be longer when available categories were of
higher similarity (Cartwright, 1941). Here, in the low-salient event
condition, luminance increases of the ﬁxation cross (i.e., events)
were more similar to the ﬁxation cross of displays without events
compared to the high-salient event condition. Therefore, the RT
results are in line with the lower sensitivities (A′) in the low-salient
compared to the high-salient event condition.
ERROR RATES AND ATTENTIONAL COMPONENTS
Mixed ANOVAs with Experiment as between-factor did not reveal
any interactions between Experiment and any of the three con-
ditions regarding error rates and attentional components (all
Fs < 1.71, all ps > 0.189).
In Experiment A, the participants’ error rates differed signiﬁ-
cantly between the three conditions, F(2,38) = 6.76, p = 0.003,
η2G = 0.066. Error rates were higher in the low-salient event
(M = 0.18, SD = 0.08) than in the control condition (M = 0.13,
SD = 0.08), t(19) = 4.35, p < 0.001, dz = 0.97. Likewise, error
rates were higher in the high-salient-event (M = 0.16, SD = 0.08)
than in the control condition, t(19) = 2.52, p = 0.021, dz = 0.56.
No signiﬁcant differences were observed between the error rates of
the low- andhigh-salient event conditions, t(19)= 0.94, p= 0.361,
dz = 0.21. In Experiment B, differences between the participant’s
error rates in the three conditions did not reach signiﬁcance,
F(1.47,26.48) = 3.14, p = 0.073, η2G = 0.022. Nevertheless, post
hoc analyses were conducted because this effect might be regarded
as close to signiﬁcance. As in ExperimentA, error rates were higher
in the low-salient event (M = 0.15, SD = 0.09) than in the con-
trol condition (M = 0.12, SD = 0.06), but this difference also
did not reach signiﬁcance, t(18) = 1.91, p = 0.073, dz = 0.72.
Different from Experiment A, error rates in the low-salient event
condition were signiﬁcantly higher than in the high-salient event
condition (M = 0.12, SD = 0.08), t(18) = 3.13, p = 0.006,
dz = 0.72, whereas there were no signiﬁcant differences between
the high-salient event and the control condition, t(18) = 0.23,
p = 0.821, dz = 0.05. It shall be noted, that these differences
between the error rates in the conditions could not have compro-
mised the observed differences between the processing speed, C,
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Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of attentional components.
Low-salient event condition High-salient event condition Control condition
Exp. A Exp. B Exp. A Exp. B Exp. A Exp. B
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
t0 20.28 (12.60) 18.20 (7.71) 20.94 (12.88) 18.28 (8.44) 22.67 (13.38) 19.05 (9.89)
K 2.76 (0.76) 3.03 (0.88) 2.75 (0.71) 2.92 (0.74) 2.81 (0.70) 3.00 (0.72)
C 46.64 (15.20) 56.71 (21.66) 56.31 (24.20) 69.62 (28.97) 72.33 (24.80) 85.07 (29.50)
α 0.66 (0.76) 0.50 (0.36) 0.54 (0.34) 0.54 (0.30) 0.49 (0.41) 0.49 (0.25)
w index 0.55 (0.14) 0.51 (0.13) 0.54 (0.14) 0.48 (0.11) 0.51 (0.11) 0.47 (0.11)
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of attentional components in the three conditions of both experiments. Described are the threshold of conscious perception,
t0 (ms), the capacity of visual short-term memory, K (number of letters), the processing speed, C (letters/s), the top-down controlled attentional selectivity, α (0
indicates perfect selection, 1 indicates non-selectivity), and the laterality of attentional weighting, windex (a value near 0 indicates a bias to the right, a value near 1
indicates a bias to the left visual hemiﬁeld).
in the conditions (see below), because these two sets of differences
were always in the same direction rather than revealing trade-off
effects.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the attentional com-
ponents in the three conditions of both experiments. Results of
ANOVAs of the attentional components are shown in Table 2.
Results of the accompanying post hoc analyses can be found in
Table 3.
The thresholds of conscious perception, t0, did not signiﬁcantly
differ between the conditions of the two experiments.
Likewise,VSTMcapacity,K, did not signiﬁcantly differ between
the conditions of the two experiments.
In contrast, visual processing speed, C, differed between the
conditions in both experiments. In Experiment A, participants on
average processed 25.70 letter/s less in the low-salient event than
in the control condition. This was replicated in Experiment B,
where participants processed on average 28.35 letter/s less in the
low-salient event than in the control condition. They processed on
average 16.02 letters/s less in the high-salient event compared to
the control condition in Experiment A. Consistently, Experiment
B yielded a difference in processing speed of 15.44 letter/s. In
addition, participants processed on average 9.68 letters/s less in
the low-salient event than in the high-salient event condition in
Experiment A. This was again replicated in Experiment B, where
they processed on average 12.91 letter/s less in the low-salient event
compared to the high-salient event condition.
In both experiments, there were no signiﬁcant differences
between the top-down controlled attentional selectivity, α, in the
three conditions.
Moreover, differences between the laterality of attentional
weighting, windex, were observed in both experiments. In Exper-
iment A, values for windex were signiﬁcantly higher in the low-
salient event compared to the control condition, indicating a
spatial attentional bias to the left visual hemiﬁeld in the former
relative to the latter condition. Likewise, values for windex were
signiﬁcantly higher in the high-salient event than in the con-
trol condition. There were no signiﬁcant differences regarding
the values for windex between the low- and high-salient event
conditions. In Experiment B, values for windex were also higher
in the low-salient event compared to the control condition, but
this difference did not reach the adjusted signiﬁcance criterion.
In contrast to Experiment A, however, the high-salient event and
the control condition did not differ signiﬁcantly regarding windex.
Moreover and again different fromExperimentA, values forwindex
Table 2 | Analyses of variance of the attentional components for the three conditions.
Experiment A Experiment B
F (dfn, dfd) p η2G F (dfn, dfd) p η
2
G
t0 0.52 (1.49, 28.26) 0.546 0.006 0.17 (2, 36) 0.846 0.002
K 0.34 (1.49, 28.38) 0.652 0.001 1.27 (2, 36) 0.294 0.003
C 16.46 (2, 38) <0.001 0.199 16.24 (2, 36) <0.001 0.163
α 1.02 (1.14, 21.70) 0.336 0.018 0.39 (2, 36) 0.677 0.005
w index 8.48 (2, 38) <0.001 0.024 3.63 (2, 36) 0.037 0.026
Repeated-measures analyses of variance of the following attentional components of both experiments: the threshold of conscious perception, t0; the capacity of
visual short-term memory, K; the processing speed, C; the top-down controlled attentional selectivity, α; and the laterality of attentional weighting, windex. Stated are
F values, degress of freedom for their numerator (dfn) and for their denominator (dfd ), p values, and η
2
G as effect size.
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Table 3 | Pairwise comparisons between attentional components of the three conditions.
Low-salient event vs. control High-salient event vs. control Low vs. high-salient event
t (df) p d z t (df) p d z t (df) p d z
Experiment A
C −5.22 (19) <0.001* −1.17 −3.35 (19) 0.003* −0.75 −2.55 (19) 0.019* −0.57
w index 3.95 (19) <0.001* 0.88 3.00 (19) 0.007* 0.67 0.90 (19) 0.379 0.20
Experiment B
C −5.81 (18) <0.001* −1.33 −2.93 (18) 0.009* −0.67 −2.70 (18) 0.015* −0.62
w index 2.13 (18) 0.048 0.49 0.87 (18) 0.394 0.20 2.28 (18) 0.035 0.52
Post hoc tests for Analyses of variance (Table 1) with signiﬁcant effects. Analyzed were the processing speed, C (letters/s) and the laterality of attentional weighting,
windex. Stated are t values with degrees of freedom (df), p values, and Cohen’s dz as effect size. Comparisons were conducted with t-tests for dependent samples
which were corrected for multiple comparisons using a modiﬁed Bonferroni adjustment (Keppel, 1973). *p < 0.033 (adjusted signiﬁcance criterion).
were higher in the low-salient event compared to the high-salient
event condition, although this difference only approached the
adjusted signiﬁcance criterion. To follow-up on these results,
the data from both experiments were collapsed. For the col-
lapsed data, windex differed between conditions, F(2,76) = 9.94,
p < 0.001, η2G = 0.023. Values for windex were signiﬁcantly
higher in the low-salient event (M = 0.54, SD = 0.13) than in
the control (M = 0.49, SD = 0.11), t(38) = 3.88, p < 0.001,
dz = 0.62, and the high-salient event condition (M = 0.51,
SD = 0.13), t(38) = 2.29, p = 0.028, dz = 0.37. In addition,
values were signiﬁcantly higher in the high-salient event condi-
tion compared to the control condition, t(38) = 2.55, p < 0.015,
dz = 0.41.
DISCUSSION
In two experiments with identical conditions, we asked whether
monitoring affects distinct TVA-based components of visual atten-
tion that were estimated from performance in a concurrent task
(see Bundesen, 1990; Vangkilde et al., 2011). More speciﬁcally,
monitoring of a speciﬁc object in the environment for events
(luminance increases) was required. The key question was how
such event monitoring affected attentional components in a con-
currently performed letter-report task. This was investigated by
comparing the attentional components when monitoring for
events was required (low-salient event condition) and when it was
not required (control condition). We were furthermore interested
in whether the effects of such monitoring vary with the expected
degree of perceptual salience of the event. To address this, a third
condition was included (high-salient event condition), in which
monitoring was required and events were of higher salience as
compared to the low-salient event condition. In both experiments,
events were more frequently detected (and faster responded to)
in the high-salient event than in the low-salient event condition,
implying that events in the former were in fact more salient than
in the latter. Also, participants showed a greater bias for reporting
the presence of an event when it was more salient.
The results show differential effects of event monitoring on the
ﬁve TVA-based attentional components.
First, in both experiments, the temporal thresholds of con-
scious perception in the letter-report task did not vary depending
on whether monitoring was required or not, or on whether events
were of a higher salience. Monitoring did thus not affect the time
necessary for visual processing to start in the letter-report task, or
to initiate the race to VSTM, respectively (cf. Bundesen, 1990).
Second, storage capacity of VSTM was approximately equal in
all conditions, in each of the two experiments. It hence appears
as if the number of VSTM slots (cf. Bundesen, 1990; Luck and
Vogel, 1997) that were available to the letters of the letter-report
task did not depend on whether monitoring was necessary or not,
or on whether events were more salient. In the present study,
monitoring required an attentional set that deﬁned the ﬁxation
cross as relevant source of events. A previous study suggests
that sustaining an attentional set to perform a visual monitor-
ing task and maintaining information in VSTM can interfere in
some circumstances (Helton and Russell, 2013). This is compat-
ible with the idea that activation-based maintenance in VSTM
relies on neuronal resources necessary for encoding new visual
information (Petersen et al., 2012; Schneider, 2013). The present
results do not indicate such interference. Crucially, the monitored
object, the ﬁxation cross, did not change across experimental
trials in both monitoring conditions. Based on previous evi-
dence (for a review, see Woodman et al., 2013), one could assume
that therefore the attentional set used to monitor the object was
retained in long-term memory and not in VSTM. This should
have decreased the costs imposed on VSTM (Woodman et al.,
2013). This attentional set was only necessary in the two con-
ditions that required monitoring but not in the control condition.
Since VSTM capacity was comparable in all three conditions, it
seems unlikely that the attentional set constantly occupied a slot
in VSTM.
Third, strong reductions in the processing speed of the let-
ters of the letter-report task were observed when the ﬁxation
cross was monitored compared to when it was not monitored
for events. This result was obtained in both experiments, and
irrespective of whether events were more or less salient. Mon-
itoring thus decreased the portion of overall visual processing
capacity that could be used for processing the letters. The idea
that attentional monitoring processes call for processing resources
that are needed by concurrent, ongoing tasks was also put for-
ward in the literature on event-based prospective memory (Smith,
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2003). In this research ﬁeld, however, theories mainly focused on
how intentions are retrieved from memory under certain trigger-
conditions (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000; Smith, 2003; Einstein
and McDaniel, 2005). Therefore, they did not attempt to specify
the mechanisms that may underlie monitoring the environment
for events. For the visual domain, this might be done using TVA
(Bundesen, 1990). For the present application, the effects on
the processing speed can be explained by TVA’s ﬁltering mech-
anism. When the ﬁxation cross was monitored for events, it was
more relevant to the task and hence received a higher attentional
weight compared to when monitoring was unnecessary. From the
viewpoint of TVA’s neural interpretation, NTVA (Bundesen et al.,
2005), more neuronal processing resources should have been allo-
cated to the ﬁxation cross due to its higher attentional weight.
Consequently, less neuronal resources should have been available
to processing the letters of the letter-report task, leading to a lower
processing speed. Distributing neuronal processing resources with
NTVA’s ﬁltering mechanism may thus provide a means to monitor
the environment for visual events. In other words, we suggest that
monitoring may be accomplished via attentional weights.
Interestingly, the letters in the letter-report task were pro-
cessed faster when the events’ salience was expected to be higher
rather than lower. This result was again obtained in both exper-
iments. A recent TVA-based study revealed that salience makes
an additional contribution to attentional weights, independent
of the task-deﬁned relevance of object features (Nordfang et al.,
2013). In the present study, the attentional weight of the ﬁx-
ation cross might have been adjusted to the expected salience
of the events. More salient events could have allowed partic-
ipants to rely more on the events’ intrinsic ability to capture
attention (e.g., Theeuwes, 2004), thereby saving visual process-
ing resources for the letter-report task. Nevertheless, the visual
processing speed in the letter-report task was still reduced when
monitoring was targeted at salient events compared to when it
was unnecessary. The attentional weight of the ﬁxation cross
still seemed increased as a consequence of monitoring, suggest-
ing “monitoring via attentional weights.” In sum, monitoring for
salient events imposes weaker costs on visual processing speed
in a concurrent task. This is partly in line with the idea that
increasing the salience of eventsmight reduce interference between
an event-based prospective memory task and an ongoing task
(McDaniel and Einstein, 2000). In contrast to this account, how-
ever, capturing interference effects by an estimation of visual
processing speed does not imply a unitary attentional resource
(cf. Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987). Instead, it focuses on one
speciﬁc attentional resource of visual processing (cf. Bundesen,
1990).
Fourth, in neither of the two experiments was the top-down
controlled attentional selectivity reliably affected by the monitor-
ing manipulation. The up-regulation of the attentional weight
of the ﬁxation cross when it was monitored for events (evident
from the effects on visual processing speed, see above), thus did
not seem to affect the relation between the attentional weights
of target and distractor letters within the letter-report task. In
the present experiments, only one object at one location in the
visual ﬁeld had to be monitored for events, and it remained visible
throughout the relevant periods of a trial. This might resemble
situations in everyday life where it is clear which location has to
be monitored to detect events of interest. A question for future
research may be whether this holds also for situations of loca-
tion uncertainty regarding the monitored information source. For
instance, adopting a less strict selectivity within a concurrent task
may be advantageous in some cases. It could facilitate the detection
of events at previously unknown locations which are irrelevant to
the concurrent task but which are supposed to trigger retrieval
of an intention from prospective memory (cf. Vangkilde et al.,
2011).
Fifth, the laterality of attentional weighting seemed affected by
the monitoring manipulation. Stronger biases to the left visual
hemiﬁeld were observed in case less-salient events were moni-
tored for. In Experiment A, a left-sided bias was also observed
when events were more salient compared to the condition with-
out monitoring requirements. In Experiment B, no such bias was
observed in this condition. When the data was collapsed across
experiments, stronger biases to the left hemiﬁeld became apparent
in the low-salient compared to the other two conditions as well
as in the high-salient event compared to the control condition.
Therefore, these results await further replication and investiga-
tion. Monitoring requirements might have led to an increase
in the experienced task-difﬁculty and might have been stronger
for low-salient than for high-salient events. This interpretation
corresponds to the higher error rates in the two event condi-
tions, which were known to participants because of their receiving
feedback. Consequently, the participants’ level of alertness may
have been higher in the two event conditions and highest in the
low-salient event condition. There is some evidence that alerting
participants by means of warning signals can introduce left-sided
biases of attentional weighting (Matthias et al., 2010). A possible
interpretation of the present results may thus be that monitor-
ing requirements can also increase the participants’ alertness level,
and thereby provoked the shifts of attentional weighting to the left
hemiﬁeld.
Moreover, the ﬁnding that event monitoring affected only two
out of ﬁve attentional components is not compatible with the
assumption of unspeciﬁc attentional resource costs (cf. Smith,
2003; Smith and Bayen, 2004).
As mentioned in the introduction, classical studies on moni-
toring were part of research on vigilance (Mackworth, 1948) or
sustained attention (e.g., Sarter et al., 2001). The experimental
task of the present study required sustained attention in the sense
of attentional sets that had to be persistently maintained across
trials. These attentional sets consisted of task-based priorities for
target and distractor letters of the letter-report task and for the
ﬁxation cross, which was monitored for events or not. Monitor-
ing should have affected these attentional sets. That is, it should
have affected the processing priorities (e.g., attentional weights of
objects) within the task. Outside the monitoring context, however,
sustained attentionmay alsomean to engage in a cognitive task (cf.
McAvinue et al., 2012; Hancock, 2013). The maintained set of pro-
cessing prioritieswouldhere encompass the entire task in question,
as opposed to other tasks or “absentmindedness” (cf. Manly et al.,
1999). On this level of analysis, sustaining attention to a task and
TVA’s attentional components (threshold of conscious perception,
VSTM capacity, visual processing speed, and top-down controlled
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attentional selectivity; estimated from performance within this
task) do not appear to be interrelated (McAvinue et al., 2012).
In summary, the present study suggests that monitoring pre-
speciﬁed objects in the environment for visual events reduces
the speed of visual processing in a concurrent task. In such sit-
uations, “monitoring-via-attentional weights” could take place.
That is, the monitored object receives an increased attentional
weight and visual processing resources are redistributed accord-
ingly. Therefore, the amount of processing resources available for
the concurrent task and the corresponding visual processing speed
are reduced. Moreover, monitoring for high-salient events seems
to imposeweaker costs on the concurrent task thanmonitoring for
low-salient events. By adjusting attentional weights to the expected
high salience of events, that is, by relying more on the events’
stimulus-driven ability to attract attention, it seems possible to
save resources for the concurrent task. There is a variety of safety-
critical settings where pre-speciﬁed locations or objects have to
be monitored for certain events while performing other visual
tasks. Performance in such settings may beneﬁt from applying the
results of the present study. Increasing the salience of events that
are to be monitored for may be used to mitigate detrimental effects
of monitoring on concurrent tasks. In the example above, anes-
thesiologists who monitor displays of a patient’s vital signs while
accomplishing other tasks may perform better in these tasks when
aberrations in these displays can be expected to be highly salient.
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